SHOCKING: IDF Knew Of Possible Hamas Rocket Fire Hours Before Attack But Didn’t Close Nova Party

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Israeli soldiers look at photos of people killed and taken captive by Hamas militants during their violent rampage through the Nova music festival in southern Israel, which are displayed at the site of the event, to commemorate the October 7, massacre, near kibbutz Re'im, Friday, Dec. 1, 2023. (AP Photo/Ariel Schalit)

JERUSALEM (VINnews) — A bombshell document revealed by the Ynet news site states that in the hours leading up to the surprise Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, an intelligence unit in the IDF had already collected a series of signs indicating preparations for rocket and missile fire towards Israel. Additionally, unusual activity was detected in Hamas’s air defense system, which could suggest the possibility of the organization moving into emergency mode – after a serious attack on Israel.

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These two signs—particularly the one related to preparations for rocket fire, along with other concerning indicators—were discussed during a series of situation assessments held within the IDF in the following hours. However, they did not lead to a warning about a potential Hamas attack, nor were significant measures taken to prepare for such an attack.

The information comes from a series of documents recently reviewed by senior government and security officials, who presented them as an explanation for the strong desire to have the IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, resign. [He has since taken responsibility for the Oct. 7th failure and resigned his position].

The documents indicate that, contrary to previous reports, the IDF’s assessment was not merely that Hamas was preparing for a drill or defense against a possible Israeli attack, but that the possibility of a Hamas attack on Israel in the immediate future was being seriously considered.

Despite this, the IDF decided to take a minimal number of actions. Given the reassuring signs and the unanimous consensus among all military and intelligence agencies, the IDF preferred to avoid burning sensitive intelligence sources rather than making broad overt preparations for a possible attack. These revelations expose a significant and dramatic part of the events leading up to the massacre. One of those involved in the discussions in recent months described them as a “nuclear bomb.”

In the days following the attack, additional intelligence indicators were published by the IDF and Shin Bet, collected during the evening and night before the massacre, including the activation of Israeli SIM cards and emergency assets that were used in the Gaza Strip during Operation “Guardian of the Walls” two years earlier. However, the preparation for possible rocket fire was seen, according to experts, as “an extremely concerning sign, especially when taken alongside other alarming signs.”

In the Southern Command, IDF Operations Directorate, and Military Intelligence Directorate, a series of investigations are still ongoing regarding that night. A person who attended one of the discussions about the investigations mentions that a senior officer said: “Let’s assume we conclude this is just a drill and there’s no real danger of an attack. But when intelligence indicates preparations for rocket fire, even with reassuring information, why not demand first and foremost to evacuate the area near the division headquarters, where thousands of people are without adequate protection against a potential rocket or mortar attack (referring to the Nova party)? This wouldn’t be the first time the Southern Command shuts down such an event.”

The investigation of that night also raises the question of whether the orders that were given were carried out, such as the Chief of Staff’s directive to conduct aerial reconnaissance to check for preparations for rocket fire.

By 2:00 AM, information about unusual activity in Hamas’s air system was transmitted to the air force control center. At the same time, dramatic additional intelligence about preparations for rocket and missile fire towards Israel was gathered.

The information mentioned here emerged at 3:00 AM in a phone-based situation assessment led by Southern Command Chief, Major General Yaron Finkelman, with the participation of staff officers and intelligence officials from the command. The situation assessment, written briefly and simply, included references to the information being discussed, “identifying unusual activity.” General Finkelman listed three possible scenarios for what might be happening on the other side of the border: the third one was “preparation for a surprise attack, with an emphasis on a raid.”

Why wasn’t the Nova party dispersed? As revealed last November, General Finkelman ordered a series of actions to be taken, but all of them were to be conducted under strict discipline regarding the protection of intelligence sources: “The division commander was instructed to increase the preparedness of our forces under the following guidelines: A. Strict protection of the intelligence that arrived, avoiding any action that could expose to the enemy that we know something unusual is happening on their side. B. Keeping actions below the threshold that could lead to miscalculation.”

A government official said: “The Southern Command knew there was a party happening there. After all, they granted the license and extended it the day before. Didn’t this information, not about a possible invasion but about the preparation for mortar and rocket fire, reach the necessary threshold to disperse the Nova party? If not, then what would have?”

It seems that there was a gap between what was written in the documents and the general sense among those involved that the threat was relatively low, perhaps even very low. “This is why source protection was prioritized,” says a senior officer. “Because if someone truly believed there was a threat, stopping it would be more important than any source, and that’s why the discussions were held in such a small forum.”

The IDF Operations Director, Major General Basiuk, received the summary of the situation assessment from the Southern Command and conducted a series of phone consultations. In the summary, it was written: “After consulting with the Deputy Head of Shin Bet, the Southern Command Chief, the Head of Operations, and the Head of Research, there are three scenarios on the table: Hamas’s readiness drill; heightened readiness due to concerns about an Israeli action; preparations for an attack against Israel in the near future, including maritime penetration, attack on an oil rig, raid, kidnapping, unusual attack, rocket fire, or aerial penetration.”

The head of operations, Major General Basiuk, did indeed assign a series of tasks to the operations division under his command, including examining the air defense status for Israel and the oil rig, but despite understanding the possibility of rocket fire, kidnapping, or an “unusual attack” (it is unclear what this means, but it’s understood that it was not positive), it was concluded: “The head of operations emphasized the need to avoid ‘security scratches’ and to maintain careful preparedness to protect sensitive sources, and to perform everything in coordination with the Intelligence Directorate” (this refers to the Intelligence Directorate’s operational division, but from the series of investigations, it appears there was no request for it to move forces along the border during the night).

A final situation assessment was scheduled to be conducted at 8:30 AM. Despite all the information that had been accumulated, the summary concluded that a further situation assessment would be held in the morning hours.

Military sources said in response to the report: “The details presented in the article do not constitute an official IDF investigation. The IDF will complete its investigations regarding October 7 in the coming weeks and will present them transparently to the public.”

 

 

 

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Nachum
Nachum
26 days ago

After the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor attack on Dec. 7, 1941, the U.S. Military, as well as the U.S. Congress held extensive investigations. As a result, General Short (who commanded all US ground forces, and Army Air Corps forces in Hawaii), and Admiral Kimmel (who commanded all US naval forces in Hawaii) were found to be negligent in not only anticipating the attack, but not preventing it, by having air patrols, which could have detected the Japanese aircraft carriers, at sea. They were relieved of their commands, and their military careers were ruined. Fast forward to 2025, and to this date, not one government investigation to get to the bottom of the misfeasance, malfeasance, and negligence by the IDF, the Shin Bet, and the Mossad, on Oct. 7, 2023, has ever been authorized by the government of Israel. I think that the reason this matter will probably be swept under the rug, is that too many people were culpable. Too many officials in the government of Israel were asleep at the wheel, and ignored repeated warnings about an impending attack. Two years before the attack, Bibi Netanyahu wrote an autobiography, which traced his roots growing up in Israel, as well as service in the IDF, and his political carer.. In that book, he looks back at the Yom Kippur War, and criticized Golda Meir, for not anticipating the attack by Egypt across the Suez Canal, and even when realizing that an attack was imminent, not calling up all of the reserves immediately before they struck. Unfortunately, when history books are written in the future about the Gaza War, Bibi will be criticized, and will have to share the blame for that surprise attack.

kmv fan
kmv fan
26 days ago

took way too long for the idf to respond in a reasonable manner for a threat they shouldve been ready for at any given moment. as horrible and scary as it may sound this was an israeli setup and the rational for it was, that the only legitimicy for a so called Jewish State is continued persecution of the Jewish people. exactly why the Israeli (not jewish) government allowed this to happen. The concept of a so called jewish state is what fuels this whole conflict look back in history and youll see that the jews lived much better between the arabs over the years than the jews in Europe up until the concept of zionism was born (approx 1900 first pogrom in israel was chevron massacre in 1927 I believe). mot saying it would be a good idea to dismantle the state but we just need to know that this problem was created by ourselves not fighting back the eiriv rav back then

Hashem please save us

Enough Bull…
Enough Bull…
26 days ago

We are not looking at the historic picture going on at and before this time. After the left lost power AGAIN they started a campaign to destroy the PM army Air Force and naval units as well as security agency’s were told to refuse to serve and as we should remember they did refuse. How far of a stretch would it be for these same units not really informing the PM of what is happening in real time. Lapid was ranting and trying to bring down bibis government. The rest is history.
The real crime no I es held responsible for this failure but collecting their pension

mee hoo ze
mee hoo ze
26 days ago

“If Hashem doesn’t watch a city, all methods are for naught.”

sam brown
sam brown
26 days ago

it was preplanned and aided by the israeli government

Noach
Noach
24 days ago

Not shocked.

NoMan
NoMan
26 days ago

20/20 hindsight. It’s so easy to be smart after the fact.

Ben Ami
Ben Ami
26 days ago

Because the Shin Daled loves when people are michalel Shabbos r”l.