Why the Dismissal of Charges Against Mayor Adams May Make Sense

By R. Yair Hoffman

Manhattan’s top federal prosecutor, Danielle Sassoon, detonated a political bombshell Thursday, resigning in fiery defiance—along with five high-ranking Justice Department officials—after refusing to kill a corruption case against New York City Mayor Eric Adams.

But one can certainly make an argument that there is rhyme and reason to what the president and the current Dept. of Justice is doing in ordering her to dismiss the case.  And that is – on account of a doctrine that, since 1963, has been ensconced in the fabric of this nation’s legal system – President Trump is merely extending it.

The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is a protective shield for the constitutional rights of this nation’s citizens.   It is, lehavdil, similar to Chazal’s protective mechanism placed for Shabbos observance.  There is a concept in halacha called “Maaseh Shabbos.”  Chazal, clearly placed restrictions upon benefitting from the fruits of Shabbos violations, and there is great debate among the Rishonim (and Acharonim) as to how fa those restrictions go. 

Imagine a tree that has been poisoned by illegal, unconstitutional actions—like unauthorized searches or coercive interrogations. No matter how sweet the fruit might appear, it is tainted by its origins. In the secular legal realm, this means that any evidence gathered as a result of such illicit actions is considered inherently corrupted and is, therefore, inadmissible in court.

This doctrine upholds the integrity of the judicial process by ensuring that law enforcement cannot benefit from misdeeds. If the justice system were to allow tainted evidence, it would signal a dangerous compromise of civil liberties and encourage further violations of constitutional rights. Instead, by barring the “fruit” of these “poisoned” sources, the courts protect citizens against overreach and maintain a commitment to fairness and lawful procedure.

The fundamental secular legal principle was established in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).  The rationale was that evidence obtained through constitutional violations must be excluded, along with any derivative evidence. The idea is that “if the State failed to prove such a search and seizure was reasonable under constitutional standards, any evidence obtained either directly or indirectly must be excluded.”

Although even the Attorney General never actually voiced this rationale, the thinking of the Attorney General and the president is that Just as constitutional violations in searches taint all subsequent evidence, a politically motivated investigation also represents a fundamental constitutional violation that should similarly taint all resulting evidence.

The underlying thinking would be that allowing politically motivated prosecutions to go forward without similar scrutiny would create an inconsistent application of constitutional protections. Just as evidence discovered after the fact cannot retroactively justify an investigation and must be thrown out – the same would be true for an investigation that was initially constitutionally tainted from its inception through political weaponization.

For legal precedent the Attorney General could possibly have cited California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) to establish that “the exclusionary rule represented the only feasible means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment.” Similarly, extending the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine may be the only effective way to deter politically motivated prosecutions that violate constitutional rights.

Although even in his letter to Danielle Sassoon, the prosecutor who just resigned, the Attorney General did not make this analogy or argument, just as Fourth Amendment protections must be uniformly applied, protections against political weaponization of the justice system require consistent application through an expanded understanding of what constitutes a poisonous tree.

It may be a strong argument, but in this writer’s opinion it should not be made to the extent of even investigating her.  She believes that the mechanism for dismissal should be through a pardon not through a new “Maaseh Shabbos” type of takana or act. Investigating her for this is, in this author’s opinion – going too far.

The author can be reached at [email protected]