Did US Intelligence Thwart Success Of Israel’s Doha Strike? It Wasn’t The First Time

As time goes by, speculation grows that Operation “Summit of Fire”, aimed at eliminating the Hamas leadership in Doha, was not a great success. The likely reason, according to Arutz Sheva’s Hagai Huberman, is American betrayal. According to these claims, the U.S. hastily informed the Qatari authorities that Israeli Air Force jets were minutes away from striking Hamas leaders. Qatar then quickly warned Hamas, allowing their leadership to scatter and evade the attack.

If true, this would be a disgraceful American act, but not an unprecedented one. It’s hard to know how many Israeli operations have failed due to similar American treachery. At least one known case is Operation “Karameh” (also known as Operation “Inferno”) on March 21, 1968, Israel’s first military operation against Palestinian terrorism following the Six-Day War. Though the names are different, the story reads as if it were written yesterday.

On March 18, 1968 (19 Adar 5728), a school bus carrying students from the Herzliya Gymnasium on a field trip hit a landmine near Be’er Ora in the Arava. Two parent chaperones were killed and many students were injured in the incident.

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was hesitant to launch a retaliatory strike against Jordan, particularly because of messages he had received from the United States. The administration of President Lyndon Johnson opposed such a move, due to America’s good relations with the Jordanian monarchy. Eshkol convened the government twice before finally approving the operation. Most ministers supported the action, except for Minister Moshe Haim Shapira of the National Religious Party.

But public opinion and pressure from the General Staff left Eshkol with no choice. The IDF launched Operation “Inferno” (its official military name) on March 21, 1968 (21 Adar 5728).

The goal was to deliver a decisive blow to the terrorist organizations based east of the Jordan River, especially in the town of Karameh, which had become a Fatah headquarters and a launching point for terrorist attacks inside Israel. This was the IDF’s first large-scale operation since the Six-Day War, involving armor, paratroopers, and air force units, targeting the Jordanian village of Karameh in the southern Jordan Valley, and the Fatah command post led by Yasser Arafat.

One reason for the high number of IDF casualties, it turns out, was American betrayal. Journalist Moshe Zak reveals in his book “Hussein Makes Peace” that on the eve of the Karameh operation, American intelligence informed Jordanian intelligence that, according to CIA information, Israel was about to launch a major attack on Fatah bases along the Jordan River. Jordanian intelligence did not keep the information to itself – it quickly shared it with Fatah commanders, including Arafat’s deputy, Abu Iyad (who was assassinated in 1991, likely by Iraqi agents).

In his own book “Without a Homeland,” Abu Iyad writes:

“In early March 1968, we received a message from one of the heads of Jordanian intelligence, Al-Hajj Arbayat, that he wished to meet with Fatah leaders… Arbayat gave us information he had received from the CIA, stating that Israel was preparing to launch a major offensive against our bases along the Jordan.

“He advised us, out of friendship, to take precautions, and invited us to Amman to meet with the Chief of Staff, General Amer Khammash, who wanted to discuss the matter. General Khammash met us on Monday, March 18, and spoke bluntly and clearly. The Israeli attack would begin within the next three days, he said, and it would be wise for the fedayeen to avoid confrontation and retreat into Jordanian territory. In any case, he emphasized, the Fatah leadership would be making a grave mistake if it exposed itself to the enemy’s blows. We must find a hiding place without delay.” (pp. 95–96)

According to Abu Iyad, if we are to believe his account, American intelligence leaked the information to Jordanian intelligence to persuade the Fatah members to retreat from the Israeli border. In practice, however, the leak benefited Fatah and led to more Israeli casualties, since the IDF lost the element of surprise. In retrospect, the American-Jordanian warning, issued three days before the operation, saved the lives of Fatah leaders, who managed to flee and hide before the Israeli strike. Meanwhile, the Jordanian army was able to prepare accordingly. So much for trusting the Americans…

By the end of the battle, the IDF had 33 soldiers killed and 161 wounded. Three were missing, though the body of one was recovered a week later. The IDF suffered the loss of 27 tanks, as well as several armored personnel carriers and half-tracks. Four tanks, three trucks, and two half-tracks were damaged or stuck in mud and were left behind, falling into Jordanian hands. In addition, an IAF Ouragan fighter jet was shot down by Jordanian anti-aircraft fire.

Fatah leader Yasser Arafat escaped by the skin of his teeth, reportedly riding a motorcycle. His survival and subsequent declaration of “victory” elevated the status of the PLO, leading to increased cross-border terrorist activity from Jordan. From that point on, Arafat led the PLO in a prolonged and bloody campaign of violence against Israel, from Jordan, then from Lebanon, and after the Oslo Accords, from the West Bank as well.