“Who will shield Am Yisroel now?” — The Chofetz Chaim upon hearing of Rav Naftoli Trop’s passing
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By Rabbi Yair Hoffman
A Torah Giant in Turbulent Times
In the waning days of Imperial Russia, as winds of change swept through Eastern Europe, a brilliant mind emerged who would transform the landscape of Torah study for generations to come. Rav Naftoli Trop (1871-1928) was no ordinary scholar. He was, as Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz would later declare, one of the four roshei yeshiva who “reinstated Torah’s glory in Am Yisroel” alongside luminaries like Rav Chaim Soloveitchik of Brisk, Rav Boruch Ber Leibowitz, and Rav Shimon Shkop.
Born on the 13th of Nisan 5631 (1871) in Grodno, a significant Jewish center in what was then the Russian Empire (now Belarus), Naftoli Tzvi Trop’s exceptional intellect was evident from his earliest years. His father, Rav Moshe Trop, headed the local yeshiva but was known for his extraordinary humility—a trait his son would inherit. His mother, Rasha, was a descendant of the legendary Gaon of Vilna and instilled in her son a deep piety that would define his character.
The Making of a Master: A Journey Through Lithuania’s Yeshivas
At just fourteen years old, young Naftoli left home to study at the famed Kelm yeshiva under Rav Simcha Zissel, known as the Alter of Kelm. It was here that he formed a decade-long partnership with Rav Yerucham Levovitz, who would later become the renowned mashgiach of the Mir Yeshiva.
Like a traveler gathering precious gems from diverse mines, Rav Naftoli’s educational journey took him through the greatest yeshivas of Lithuania—each leaving its distinct imprint on his developing worldview. He studied briefly in Slabodka and Telz, where he became close to Rav Eliezer Gordon, a relationship that would profoundly influence his approach to learning.
The turning point in his intellectual development came in 1889 when he returned to Slabodka just as Rav Yaakov Yitzchak Rabinowitz (known as Rav Itzele Ponovezher) became rosh yeshiva. Under Rav Itzele’s guidance, Rav Naftoli mastered the analytical approach to Talmud study pioneered by Rav Chaim Soloveitchik—a methodology that would revolutionize the Torah world.
Personal Tragedy and Triumph
Life tested Rav Naftoli early. At twenty-one, he became engaged to the daughter of the illustrious Rav Nosson Tzvi Finkel, the Alter of Slabodka. Tragedy struck when his kallah died just months before their wedding. Though heartbroken, he found solace in his Torah studies, channeling his grief into intellectual growth.
A year later, on the 11th of Tammuz 5655 (1895), he married Pesya Leah, daughter of Rav Eliezer Yaakov Chavas of Yanishok. The wedding drew the era’s greatest Torah scholars, with his father-in-law prophetically declaring in the invitation that his new son-in-law was “capable of being nothing less than a godol beYisroel”—a giant among Israel.
The Call to Radin
In 1903, at the age of thirty-three, Rav Naftoli received a letter that would define the rest of his life. The Chofetz Chaim, one of the generation’s most revered figures, personally invited him to become the rosh yeshiva of the Radin Yeshiva. “I heard that Hashem is helping you in your efforts to teach Torah and to instill your students with yiras Shomayim,” wrote the Chofetz Chaim. “I would be very happy—if Hashem so wills—if Kevodo accepted the position of rosh yeshiva of Radin.”
The position was then held by Rav Moshe Londinsky, a brilliant scholar who nonetheless recognized the yeshiva’s need for someone with Rav Naftoli’s unique blend of intellectual prowess and spiritual authority. In a remarkable display of selflessness, Rav Moshe voluntarily stepped aside, initiating what would become a close friendship with his successor.
A Revolutionary Approach to Learning
What made Rav Naftoli Trop one of history’s greatest roshei yeshiva? Those who witnessed his shiurim (lectures) described them as electrifying intellectual experiences that transformed the very nature of Talmudic discourse.
Unlike many teachers who presented polished, final conclusions, Rav Naftoli invited his students into the very laboratory of Torah thought. He would “build worlds and destroy them,” developing brilliant insights only to tear them apart when contradictions emerged. When a student would pose a penetrating question that demolished the carefully constructed edifice of his shiur, Rav Naftoli would break into joyous dance, clapping his hands in ecstatic celebration. For him, the ultimate achievement was not delivering perfect lectures but cultivating independent, critical thinkers.
To fully appreciate the revolutionary nature of his approach, one must understand the context of early 20th century yeshiva education. In an era when many teachers demanded deference and discouraged questioning, Rav Naftoli created an environment where the beis medrash “was aflame with rischa deOraisa”—the passionate fire of Torah debate.
His physical exertion during study was legendary. He would wrap a towel around his head to absorb the perspiration produced by his intense concentration, demonstrating through personal example that Torah study demanded one’s complete being—intellectual, emotional, and physical.
The Father of His Students
“I adopt every new student in the yeshiva and consider him my very own son. Isn’t being the son of the rosh yeshiva of Radin—my son—sufficient yichus (lineage)?” These words, spoken to a nervous applicant, capture the essence of Rav Naftoli’s relationship with his students.
Stories of his extraordinary devotion abound. When the twelve-year-old Aryeh Leib Grossnass (later a renowned dayan in London) traveled alone from Germany to Radin only to be rejected by the yeshiva secretary, he sat crying on the steps until a “fatherly looking man” inquired about his distress. Upon hearing the boy’s sincere desire to study Torah “the entire day, as it is in Radin,” Rav Naftoli personally escorted him inside and instructed the secretary to register him immediately.
Rav Nochum Meir Karelitz (later the brother-in-law of the Chazon Ish) recalled how Rav Naftoli offered to study with him one-on-one. When the shy student demurred, explaining he had already promised to learn with friends, Rav Naftoli suggested they study at dawn. When Karelitz worried he wouldn’t wake up on time, the rosh yeshiva simply offered to come to his lodgings to wake him personally.
Among the brilliant students who flourished under his guidance were Rav Yechezkel Sarna, Rav Yosef Shlomo Kahaneman (the future Ponovezher Rov who studied with Rav Naftoli for over five years), and Rav Dovid Leibowitz.
A Living Mussar Sefer
Rav Naftoli’s greatness extended far beyond his intellectual brilliance. His character embodied the ideals of the mussar (ethical development) movement that had transformed Lithuanian yeshivas. Having absorbed the approaches of Kelm, Slabodka, and Novardok, he integrated the best of each into a harmonious whole.
His davening (prayer) was described by the Ponovezher Rov as that of a person who would “cling to Hashem with the naturalness of a child pleading with his father.” Before the evening prayers, he would study mussar texts with such fervor that students recalled how “our hearts would melt, cherdas kodesh (holy trembling) would envelop us and our thoughts would be cleansed and uplifted.”
The authenticity of his ethical teachings was demonstrated through his actions. When a reputed thief once visited Radin, Rav Naftoli not only invited him home for a meal but prepared a comfortable room for him. When questioned about this hospitality toward a known criminal, he replied: “Does the fact that he is a thief absolve me from my obligation to fulfill the mitzva of being hospitable toward him? He is a Jew too, and he is also a human being.” Though he remained awake all night to protect his possessions, he refused to deny the man basic human dignity.
Reverence for the Chofetz Chaim
For twenty-five years, Rav Naftoli never missed the Chofetz Chaim’s weekly talk. He would prepare for these sessions as if for a profound spiritual encounter and afterward discuss them with his students “with awe and amazement.”
This reverence was mutual. The Chofetz Chaim consulted Rav Naftoli during the compilation of his magnum opus, the Mishna Berurah, particularly when deciding between differing opinions among the poskim (halachic authorities). In a remarkable display of trust, the Chofetz Chaim also included Rav Naftoli, along with Rav Elchonon Wassermann, in the extrication of a dybbuk from a young Jewish girl near Vilna—an event that reflected the extraordinary spiritual stature attributed to him by his contemporaries.
War, Suffering, and Final Days
The First World War brought intense suffering to Eastern Europe’s Jewish communities. Rather than seeking safety elsewhere, Rav Naftoli remained with his students despite the hunger and hardship. When the yeshiva relocated from Shumiatz to Snovesk, a typhus epidemic struck, afflicting many students including Rav Naftoli’s son Avrohom.
While his son recovered, his beloved wife Pesya Leah contracted the disease and passed away on 5 Nisan 5680 (1920). Though devastated by this loss, Rav Naftoli continued teaching without interruption, channeling his grief into his sacred work.
In the summer of 5689 (1929), Rav Naftoli began suffering excruciating headaches. When doctors warned him to reduce his Torah study as it posed a danger to his life, he replied with characteristic devotion: “My life will be in greater danger if I don’t study Torah.”
During Selichos week that year, he suffered a devastating stroke. Despite the fervent prayers of his students, Rav Naftoli Tzvi Trop returned his soul to his Creator on Erev Tzom Gedaliah 5690 (1929), at just fifty-nine years of age.
When the news reached the Chofetz Chaim, the elderly sage cried out in anguish: “Who will shield Am Yisroel now?”
A Legacy That Endures
Decades after his passing, a student was observed climbing over the fence of Grodno’s Jewish cemetery to prostrate himself on Rav Naftoli’s grave, crying out: “Rebbe, in whose care have you left us?”
This poignant scene captures the extraordinary bond Rav Naftoli formed with his students—a bond that transcended the grave. His chiddushim (novellae), published as Chiddushei HaGrenat, remain cornerstones of yeshiva study worldwide. The analytical method he perfected continues to shape how Torah is studied in yeshivas across the globe.
His descendants continued his legacy. His son Rav Avrohom served as a rosh yeshiva in Radin until World War II before immigrating to America, where he led Yeshivas Chofetz Chaim in New York and later Karlin-Stolin, before settling in Israel. His second son, Rav Reuven, joined the founders of the Knesses Yisroel yeshiva in Hebron. Tragically, his daughter Toiba and her husband Rav Yehoshua Eizek Kaminetsky, along with their family, were murdered by the Nazis.
In the annals of Torah scholarship, few figures have left as profound an imprint as Rav Naftoli Trop—a genius in Torah and a genius in middos (character traits)—whose life continues to inspire generations of Torah scholars nearly a century after his passing.
As one of his contemporaries noted: “HaRav Naftoli Tzvi knew neither rest nor peace until he had arrived at the core of the truth with all its ramifications and profundities. When he arrived at the truth, he would leap for joy, as if he had received a Divine revelation of Torah’s mysteries.”
This relentless pursuit of truth, combined with extraordinary humility and compassion, created a legacy that continues to illuminate the path for all who seek to grow in Torah and refine their character in his image.
The author can be reached at [email protected]
Yad L’Tzedaka: Understanding Implicit Charity Vows
By Rabbi Yair Hoffman
Key Sources:
- Ran, Nedarim 7a “Ul’inyan Halacha”
- Machane Ephraim, Hilchos Tzedaka, Siman 2
- Nesivos HaMishpat, Dinei Tfisa, Klal 2
- Tosfos Yom Tov, Peah 5:4 “V’nosain l’aniyim”
- Shach 259:14
- Teshuvas Maharit #39
Introduction
The term “Yad” regarding Nedarim (vows) refers to a “handle” or abbreviated statement. We rule that a truncated neder is as effective as a fully stated vow. But what about abbreviated vows for charity (tzedakah)? The Gemara on Nedarim 7a raises this question but ends with an unresolved doubt (safek).
There is a fascinating and lengthy commentary by the Ran that discusses this issue. Regarding practical halacha, we rule stringently, saying that yes, there is “yad l’tzedakah” (abbreviated charity vows are binding). This is the ruling in the Rambam (Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 8:2), the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch (Siman 258:2).
Why Are We Stringent?
We rule stringently either because:
- We are dealing with a possible Torah prohibition of “Bal Te’acher” (not delaying fulfillment of vows), or
- The Gemara’s discussion suggests this is the preferred direction by pursuing the “im timtzah lomar yaish yad litzdakah” (if you will say there is “yad” for charity) line of reasoning.
So if you say, for example, after giving some charity, “And this…” it is binding. The Keren Orah and Kehilas Yaakov note that the Gemara is only discussing cases within “toch kedai dibbur” (the time it takes to say a brief greeting). Otherwise, it would not qualify as a “yad.”
Interestingly, the Vilna Gaon (in 259:16) seems to hold that we are lenient – contrary to the Shulchan Aruch and Rambam – and also understands that there is a disagreement between the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds on this matter.
This has numerous practical implications. For instance, if you told someone you’re giving them a charitable donation but can’t remember the exact amount, must you write a check for the maximum possible amount to remove all doubt? According to the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch, yes. According to the Vilna Gaon, perhaps not. This relates to the Gemara in Menachos 106b: “I specified but don’t remember what I specified” – the Vilna Gaon would apparently have to say that the Jerusalem Talmud disagrees with this.
A Major Dispute
The Kuntrus HaSfeikos (1:9) notes a major dispute among the Rishonim regarding doubts in charity matters. Do we treat them like monetary doubts (safek mammon), where we rule leniently, or like ritual prohibitions (safek issur), where we rule stringently?
Goal of This Analysis
The goal of this analysis is to provide a framework for understanding this dispute among the Rishonim.
Dispute Between the Ran vs. Ramban and Rashba
The Ran (in “Ul’inyan Halacha”) cites the Ramban who states that since this involves a question of prohibition, we rule stringently. The Ran explains that this is also the Rashba’s view.
The Ran himself disagrees with their view, arguing that all cases of uncertain charitable obligations (safek matanos aniyim) should be considered monetary disputes (sfaika d’mamona), and we should rule leniently as in all other monetary cases.
The Ran raises two objections to the Ramban and Rashba’s view:
First Objection: From Chulin
The first comes from the Gemara in Chulin 134a. A convert had a cow that was slaughtered. We don’t know whether the cow was slaughtered before or after his conversion. If before, he’s exempt from giving the priestly gifts (matnos kehuna); if after, he’s obligated. The Mishnah rules that in such a doubt, he’s exempt.
The Gemara contrasts this with a case of an anthill: If grain is found in it and we’re uncertain whether it came from the owner or was dropped harvest (leket), the Mishnah in Peah rules it’s considered “safek leket” (possibly dropped harvest) and must be given to the poor. The basis for this obligation comes from the verse “justify the poor and destitute” (Deuteronomy 16:20), which the Gemara interprets as “give what is rightfully his.”
The Gemara asks: What’s the difference between uncertain dropped harvest (safek leket) and uncertain priestly gifts (safek matnos kehuna)? It answers that with safek leket, there’s a presumption of obligation since it’s found in a place the owner hasn’t yet collected from. With the convert’s cow, the presumption favors exemption since he began as a non-Jew.
The Ran argues: According to the Ramban and Rashba, who hold that every doubt regarding charitable gifts should be treated stringently as a Torah prohibition, the Gemara could have simply distinguished between priestly gifts (which are purely monetary) and poor-man’s gifts (which involve prohibitions). Since the Gemara didn’t make this distinction but instead relied on the presumption argument, this suggests that without such presumption, one would be exempt even in cases of doubt regarding charitable gifts!
Second Objection: From Yoma
The Ran’s second objection comes from the Gemara in Yoma 8b. There, the Gemara explains that for “demai” (produce purchased from an am ha’aretz who might not have separated tithes properly), the Sages only required bakers to separate trumas maaser, but not terumah gedolah, maaser rishon, or maaser ani. Why? Because most am ha’aretzim do separate terumah gedolah, and for maaser rishon and maaser ani, the burden of proof is on the claimant. The Gemara asks why they weren’t required to separate maaser sheni.
The Ran points out that if uncertainties regarding charitable gifts were treated as ritual prohibitions, the Gemara should have also questioned why they weren’t required to separate maaser ani! Since it only questioned maaser sheni, this suggests that uncertainties regarding charitable gifts are treated leniently.
Based on these two proofs, the Ran concludes that doubts regarding charitable gifts should be treated leniently.
Three Approaches to Understanding the Dispute
There are three main approaches in the Acharonim, and I’d like to suggest a fourth:
First Approach: Machaneh Ephraim
Rabbi Ephraim Navon (1677-1735), author of Machaneh Ephraim, asks a fundamental question (Hilchos Tzedakah 2): There’s a concept that verbal dedication to the Temple (amirah legavoah) is equivalent to physical transfer to an ordinary person. Does the same principle apply to charity? When someone says, “This coin is for the poor,” does it immediately become theirs without requiring a formal acquisition?
The Machaneh Ephraim connects this issue to the debate between the Ran and the Rashba:
- According to the Ran, verbal declaration for charity is like physical transfer to the poor, so there’s no prohibition of “bal te’acher” (delaying fulfillment). The statement creates an immediate transfer of ownership.
- The Rashba holds that this principle only applies to Temple dedications, not charity. The verbal declaration creates a vow obligation but not a transfer of ownership.
Problems with the Machaneh Ephraim’s Approach
One issue with this approach is that it only explains the Rashba’s position regarding charity (tzedakah), but not regarding dropped harvest (peah), which is certainly first considered the property of the poor.
Second Approach: Nesivos and Others
This approach, advocated by the Nesivos HaMishpat, Rabbi Dovid Povarsky, the Steipler, and the Shaarei Yosher, connects the dispute to another disagreement about consecrating something that doesn’t yet exist in the world.
The Rambam (Hilchos Mechirah 20:15) explains that if someone says, “Whatever my animal gives birth to shall be dedicated to Temple maintenance,” even though the consecration isn’t technically valid, he’s obligated to fulfill his word based on the verse “he shall do according to all that proceeds from his mouth.” This would align with the Rashba’s position.
The Raavad disagrees, saying it’s not binding because it concerns something not yet in existence and wasn’t phrased as a personal vow. This would align with the Ran’s position.
Problem with the Second Approach
With this approach, there would still be a doubt regarding prohibition in the anthill case. According to the Rashba, there would be a potential prohibition of not properly gleaning, so even without the presumption issue, we should rule stringently. The Nesivos offers an answer, but it’s not straightforward.
Third Approach: The Granat’s View
Rabbi Naftali Trop (the “Granat”) follows the basic structure of the Machaneh Ephraim but with a different twist. He explains that in cases of monetary doubt, we rule leniently even though there’s a potential prohibition of stealing, because:
In any doubt, we follow a presumption (chazakah) to resolve it. For monetary cases, we establish ownership based on presumption, and once that’s decided, there’s no further prohibition question.
If we say that verbal declaration for charity is like physical transfer, then uncertain charity cases become uncertain monetary claims of the poor, which we rule leniently. Once we rule the money isn’t the poor’s (based on presumption), there’s no prohibition of “bal te’acher.”
The Ran would hold that charity declarations immediately transfer ownership (like the Machaneh Ephraim said), while the Rashba would hold they don’t. For the Rashba, the prohibition of “bal te’acher” applies even to one’s own money if obligated by vow to give it to charity. When there’s doubt about the vow, one must still fulfill it because of the potential prohibition.
Fourth Approach (My Suggestion)
Addressing the Objection from Yoma:
One could simply answer that “demai” already has a majority (rov) – most am ha’aretzim do separate the required gifts. The Gemara didn’t question maaser ani because of this majority, but without such majority, it would have been questioned.
The Chasam Sofer in Yoreh Deah 240 answers the Ran’s objection similarly.
Addressing the Objection from Chulin:
The Ran’s point is that the need for a presumption of obligation (chezkas chiyuv) for dropped harvest (leket) suggests that without such presumption, one would be exempt. This is how the Maharit (Teshuva 39) understands the Ran, bringing support from Bechoros 17a.
However, the Turei Even on Rosh Hashana interprets differently: it’s not that absence of presumption of obligation means exemption, but rather that the cow has a presumption of exemption from before conversion. He suggests that the mention of presumption of obligation for dropped harvest isn’t essential to the argument.
The Turei Even attempts to reconcile the Ramban and Rashba’s position by saying that for charity without a presumption of exemption, we should rule stringently.
Novel Insight Regarding Uncertain Dropped Harvest:
I’d like to suggest a novel insight about “safek leket” (uncertain dropped harvest): The Tosfos Yom Tov in Peah rules that a poor person who receives safek leket is completely exempt from separating tithes from it! This suggests that safek leket isn’t just treated stringently; it’s considered definitively leket by Torah decree.
If so, we can’t compare cases where the Torah definitively establishes status to cases of genuine uncertainty. The Rashba and Ramban could interpret the Gemara according to Tosfos Yom Tov, meaning there would be no proof either way from Chulin.
But what about the cow case, where there’s a presumption of exemption?
Chazon Ish’s Insight:
The Chazon Ish (YD 7:6) notes that the presumption in the convert’s cow case isn’t straightforward. True, the convert was a non-Jew until conversion, creating a presumption of exemption from priestly gifts, but the cow also has a presumption of being alive, suggesting it was still alive when its owner converted, which would create an obligation.
The Ran might hold that these two presumptions cancel each other out. The Rashba and Ramban could hold that since presumption is just a guideline (as seen in Responsa of Rabbi Akiva Eiger #136), the first applicable presumption prevails. The presumption regarding the convert applies first, because we don’t apply presumptions about priestly gifts to a non-Jew’s cow. The Ran might hold that presumption offers some degree of factual clarification.
The advantage of this fourth approach is that it avoids the difficulties found in the previous approaches.
What follows is a translation of the GraNat’s Shiur on the Topic:
Appendix: Translation of the Granat’s Analysis
Rabbi Naftali Trop (1871-1928, also known as the Granat, whose yahrzeit is 3 Tishrei), was the Rosh Yeshiva of the Chofetz Chaim’s Yeshiva in Radin, Poland. He also delivered a lecture on this subject.
Question on the Ran
Rabbi Naftali asks regarding the Ran’s position: Every case of uncertain charitable obligations (safek matanos aniyim) also involves potential prohibitions, not just monetary questions. There are the prohibitions of “bal yachel” and “bal te’acher” (not delaying vow fulfillment)! If so, shouldn’t we rule stringently?
The Nesivos Rules Stringently
Indeed, for this very reason, the Nesivos HaMishpat (Dinei Tfisah 2) rules that any question regarding charitable obligations must be treated stringently since it involves the prohibitions of “bal yachel” and “bal te’acher.” This differs from other monetary doubts where, even though there might be a potential prohibition of “lo sigzol” (stealing), the Torah didn’t prohibit uncertain theft. The Ran’s view requires explanation.
Machaneh Ephraim’s Approach
Rabbi Ephraim Navon (1677-1735), the author of Machaneh Ephraim, asks (Hilchos Tzedakah 2): There’s a concept that verbal dedication to the Temple is equivalent to physical transfer to an ordinary person. Does the same apply to charity? The Machaneh Ephraim connects this to the debate between the Ran and Rashba. According to the Ran, verbal declaration for charity is like physical transfer to the poor, so there’s no prohibition of delayed fulfillment.
Rabbi Naftali also cites Rabbi Yehoshua Yitzchok Shapira (1801-1873), author of Emek Yehoshua (16), who similarly explains that according to the Ran, verbal declaration for charity is like physical transfer. He adds that this means there’s no prohibition question at all. Why? Because even if abbreviated charity vows are binding, the money already belongs to the poor. There’s no longer a prohibition of unfulfilled vows—the vow has already been fulfilled!
Problem with this Approach
Rabbi Naftali raises an objection from the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah (6a), which explicitly states that even if one says, “I will separate the animal but won’t actually bring it as an offering,” he violates “bal te’acher.”
This suggests the same would apply to charity—if one says, “I will separate it but not physically give it to them,” he would violate “bal te’acher.” Yet according to the Emek Yehoshua, this shouldn’t be possible since the declaration already fulfills the vow and transfers ownership to the poor. The prohibition of “bal te’acher” shouldn’t apply.
We must conclude that even though the money belongs to the poor and the vow is fulfilled through declaration, since he’s still holding their property and hasn’t physically handed it over, he violates “bal te’acher.”
Turei Even’s Question
Rabbi Aryeh Leib Gunsberg (1695-1785, also known as the Shagas Aryeh), in his Turei Even (Rosh Hashanah 4a), questions Reish Lakish’s opinion cited in Chulin (139a). Reish Lakish holds that if a person consecrates money to Temple maintenance, he’s not financially responsible for it. If so, asks the Turei Even, how can “bal te’acher” ever apply?
Addressing the Turei Even’s Question
This question isn’t really valid because the Gemara in Chulin specifically asks about Reish Lakish’s view only in the case where someone says, “This house is an offering for Temple maintenance,” and the house collapses—then he’s obligated to pay. The Gemara answers that this obligation only applies when the house has collapsed; when the item still exists somewhere, it’s considered to be in God’s domain.
The Vow Isn’t Fulfilled by Declaration Alone
It’s clear that even according to Reish Lakish, one doesn’t fulfill his vow just by declaring something consecrated. If that were the case, why would he be obligated when the item no longer exists? He would have already fulfilled his vow!
Rather, Reish Lakish holds that regarding payment obligation—as long as the item still exists in God’s domain, he’s exempt from payment.
According to this understanding, even Reish Lakish would agree that one can violate “bal te’acher” regarding Temple maintenance even after declaration. Why? Because he hasn’t yet fulfilled the vow.
It’s clear from the Turei Even’s words that once someone has fulfilled a vow, the prohibition of “bal te’acher” no longer applies. This is also the rationale of the Emek Yehoshua mentioned earlier. However, we’ve already shown this is impossible, because according to this view, there would never be a case of “bal te’acher” where someone separated something but didn’t give it to the recipients, if we accept that for charity, declaration is like transfer.
If so, we must say that the nature of “bal te’acher” when someone has separated something but hasn’t given it yet is that he’s obligated to give the recipients what has become their property through his vow.
Presumption (Chazakah) Removes the Prohibition
Rabbi Naftali offers his novel insight: Whenever we rule leniently in cases of monetary doubt, even though there’s a potential prohibition of stealing, we can explain it as follows:
In any doubt, we follow a presumption (chazakah) to resolve it. For example, with a woman whose marital status is uncertain, we establish her based on her previous presumption—being unmarried. Similarly, for monetary doubts, we establish ownership based on presumption, and the doubt is resolved.
This is why we rule leniently in monetary disputes in favor of the defendant—the plaintiff cannot take money based on doubt. Once the situation is ruled upon based on presumption, there’s no further prohibition of stealing because the money is legally established as belonging to the possessor.
According to this explanation, when there’s doubt regarding charitable obligations, if we accept that declaration for charity is like physical transfer, then this money is considered potentially belonging to the poor, and we rule leniently in favor of the current possessor, just as in any monetary dispute. Once it’s established as his money, there’s no problem of delayed fulfillment.
The nature of “bal te’acher” when something was separated but not yet given is that one is obligated to give the poor what has become their property. Here, the ruling (based on presumption) establishes that it is NOT the poor’s property, so just as there’s no prohibition of stealing, there’s no prohibition of “bal te’acher” because the prohibition only applies to property belonging to the poor.
Explaining the Ran and Rashba’s Positions
The Ran could hold that charitable doubts are like general monetary doubts—ruled leniently with no resulting prohibition.
The Rashba, however, holds that for charity, declaration is not like physical transfer. Therefore, the nature of “bal te’acher” for charity applies even to one’s own money when obligated by vow to give it to the poor. When there’s doubt about the vow, one must still fulfill it because of the potential prohibition, just as with any other prohibition doubt.
This aligns with the Machaneh Ephraim’s explanation connecting the debate between the Ran and Rashba to whether declaration for charity is equivalent to physical transfer to the poor.
