by Chaim Weber
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We find that chazal forbade us from performing certain mitzvos on shabbos due to concerns that shabbos might be violated.
For example, reading Megillah, taking lulav or blowing shofar on shabbos are all forbidden due to concerns that one may want to consult an expert and come to carry in a public domain – thereby violating the prohibition against carrying. This decree is called g’zeira d’Rabbah (Rabbah’s decree).
The Tosfos Yom Tov (Megillah 1:2) asks why doesn’t Rabbah’s decree apply to laining on shabbos?
True, the Gemara in Bava Kamma (82a) says that the neviim instituted that we should lain every Monday, Thursday and shabbos. But similar to Megillah, shofar and lulav, why didn’t chazal subsequently forbid laining due to Rabbah’s decree?
The Tosfos Yom Tov answers that by laining, the baal korei is supposed to practice a few times beforehand to prepare the laining. Therefore, there’s no concern of him needing to consult with an expert.
However, other acharonim are unsure about this answer, as gezeira d’Rabbah applies to Megillah as well! There also, the baal korei undoubtedly prepares!
The Pri Megadim (Orach Chaim 282:1) quotes the Tosfos Shabbos that chazal didn’t enact Rabbah’s decree by laining on shabbos, as doing so would cause the entire mitzvah of laining on shabbos to fall away.
The Tosfos Shabbos compares this to a Taz (Orach Chaim 588:5) who uses this idea to answer a different question: why didn’t chazal forbid blowing shofar on yom tov due to concerns that one would fix musical instruments? We find that other musical activities are forbidden for this exact reason!
The Taz answers that forbidding the blowing of shofar on yom tov (even if it doesn’t fall out on a shabbos) would annul the mitzvah of shofar entirely. In such a case, chazal would not institute such a decree.
The Pri Megadim is unsure if it’s fair to apply the Taz’s answer to laining, as perhaps only by an explicit mitzvah in the Torah were chazal hesitant to remove the mitzvah entirely. Perhaps not by laining, which is a takanas neviim. He leaves the matter as tzarich iyun – a matter needing further thought. (It should be noted that according to the Rambam, laining is a takana from Moshe Rabbeinu, though it’s still not an explicit mitzvah in the Torah.)
Other explanations are also given to answer the Tosfos Yom Tov’s question.
The Daas Torah answers that as we aren’t allowed to bring a sefer torah out of a shul except for an adam chashuv, there’s no concern that one would bring a sefer torah to an expert.
The Vilna Gaon (Maaseh Rav 175, Hagahos Peulas Sachir) answers that since laining is a communal mitzvah and can’t be done with less than ten people, there’s no concern that someone will come to carry the sefer torah, as people will remind each other not to violate shabbos.
What About Bris Mila?
The halacha is that we may perform a bris mila on shabbos.
Why doesn’t Rabbah’s decree apply to bris mila? Shouldn’t we be afraid that the mohel will have a question and want to consult with an expert – thereby carrying the mila knife?
Some Rishonim ask further that we should also be concerned about the potential to carry the baby himself! Although carrying a person is not a Torah violation, as there’s a principal “chai nosei es atzmo – a living being carries himself,” there’s still a Rabbinic prohibition!
Tosfos in Megillah (4b) gives two answers:
Firstly, bris mila is such an important mitzvah that 13 covenants were made because of it. As such, though we’re concerned about chilul shabbos, chazal didn’t want to push off the mitzvah of bris mila.
Secondly, Tosfos answers that since every mohel is assumed to be an expert in the craft of mila, there’s no concern of him needing to consult others.
The Ritva (Sukkah 43a and Megillah 4b) provides two additional answers.
Firstly, he notes that chazal only instituted Rabbah’s decree to uproot Megilla, which is a mitzvah d’rabbanan, or shofar and lulav, where there’s some uncertainty related to the mitzvah, as we’re no longer experts in establishing the calendar. However, by a clear Torah mitzvah, chazal would not uproot the mitzvah solely because of Rabbah’s decree.
Additionally, the Ritva notes that since the Torah permitted bris mila on shabbos despite the act of mila being an automatic melacha violation, chazal wouldn’t forbid bris mila for concerns one may violate a different melacha (ie. carrying).
The Ran answers that by mila, only the father and mohel are commanded so if they would have a lapse in judgment and forget about the prohibition against carrying, they would be reminded by others. By Megillah, shofar and lulav, everyone is equally absorbed in trying to fulfill their own obligation and will be too distracted to remind others. Therefore, Rabbah’s decree applies.
The Chiddush of the Taz… and the Meiri!
The Taz (Orach Chaim 588:5 and Choshen Mishpat 2:1) provides an additional answer.
He notes that chazal will never make a decree that goes against an explicit verse in the Torah. As the Torah explicitly says that we perform mila “uvayom hashemini – on the eighth day” and chazal learn that this includes shabbos, chazal wouldn’t decree to forbid mila.
The Taz brings an interesting proof to this idea: The Gemara (Sanhedrin 46a and Yevamos 90b) says that chachamim have the power to enact punishments even when the Torah doesn’t demand punishment, not to violate the Torah rather to protect the Torah. The Rambam and Tur quote this language as halacha.
The Taz wonders why the phrase “not to violate the Torah” is necessary? Of course chazal can’t violate the Torah?
The Taz answers that built into the power of chachamim to make a decree is also the limitation that their decree can’t go against an explicit verse in the Torah.
Amazingly, although the Taz didn’t have access to the Meiri (whose monumental work Beis Habechira was only discovered in the twentieth century), the Meiri (Megilla 4a) gives the exact same answer, noting that chazal wouldn’t forbid mila on shabbos, as it’s explicitly permitted in the Torah from the verse “uvayom hashemini.”